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Wittgenstein and Kripke disagree about the status of the proposi-
tion: the Standard Metre is one metre long. Wittgenstein believes
it is necessary. Kripke argues that it is contingent. Kripke’s argu-
ment depends crucially on a certain sort of thought-experiment with
which we are invited to test our intuitions about what is and isn’t
necessary. In this paper I argue that, while Kripke’s conclusion is
strictly correct, nevertheless similar Kripke-style thought experi-
ments indicate that the metric system of measurement is after all
relative in something like the way Wittgenstein seems to think.
Central to this paper is a thought-experiment I call The Smedlium
Case.
The standard metre
In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein makes the following
intriguing remark.
There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is a
metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the
Standard Metre in Paris. – But this is, of course, not to ascribe
any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar
role in the language-game of measuring with a metre rule.1
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke takes issue with Wittgenstein.
Using ‘S’ to refer to ‘a certain stick or bar in Paris’, Kripke objects
as follows.
This seems a very ‘extraordinary property’, actually, for any
stick to have. I think [Wittgenstein] must be wrong . . . Part of
the problem which is bothering Wittgenstein is, of course, that
this stick serves as a standard of length and so we can’t attrib-
ute length to it. Be this as it may (well, it may not be), is the
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Basil Blackwell, 1953), I §50.
rati_280.qxd  2/18/05  3:09 PM  Page 145
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005
146 STEPHEN LAW
statement ‘stick S is one meter long’, a necessary truth? Of
course its length might vary in time. We could make the defi-
nition more precise by stipulating that one meter is to be the
length of S at time t0. Is it then a necessary truth that stick S is
one meter long at time t0? Someone who thinks that everything
one knows a priori is necessary might think: ‘This is the defini-
tion of a meter. By definition, stick S is one meter long at t0.
That’s a necessary truth.’ But there seems to me no reason so
to conclude, even for a man who uses the stated definition of
‘one meter’. For he’s using this definition not to give the
meaning of what he called the ‘meter’, but to fix the reference
. . . There is a certain length which he wants to mark out. He
marks it out by an accidental property, namely that there is a
stick of that length. Someone else might mark out the same ref-
erence by another accidental property. But in any case, even
though he uses this to fix the reference of his standard of
length, a meter, he can still say, if heat had been applied to this
stick S at t0, then at t0 stick S would not have been one meter
long.
Kripke raises three separate questions in this paragraph. First,
does ‘one metre’ have the same meaning as a definite description,
eg. the description ‘the length of the Standard Metre’?2 Second,
is it a priori that the Standard Metre is one metre long? Third, is
it necessary that the Standard Metre is one metre long? Kripke
accepts that it is a priori that the Standard Metre is one metre
long (at time t0). However, Kripke denies that it is necessary. He
also denies that ‘one metre’ is synonymous with ‘the length of
stick S (at time t0)’.
To which of the three questions does Kripke suppose 
Wittgenstein would answer ‘yes’? he suggestion seems to be: to all
three.
2 Kripke, Saul, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp. 54–55. As 
is now well-known, the modal intuition to which Kripke here appeals – intuitively, the 
Standard Metre might not have been one metre long – fails to support at least one of the
conclusions Kripke wishes to draw, i.e. the conclusion that ‘one metre’ does not have 
the same meaning as a description. ‘One metre’, as defined by reference to the length of
stick S, might yet be synonymous with, say, the description ‘the length of stick S at t0 at the
actual world’, where the effect of adding ‘at the actual world’ is to rigidify the description.
I set to one side the issue of whether ‘one metre’ is a descriptive name (by a descriptive
name I mean a name sharing the same meaning as a definite description).
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The necessity claim
I am going to focus here on the dispute over whether it is neces-
sary that the Standard Metre is one metre long. I shall assume in
this paper that Wittgenstein believes it is necessary.3
Why might Wittgenstein believe this? Kripke’s suggestion
appears to be: because the expression ‘one metre’ is defined by 
reference to the length of the Standard Metre. Therefore what 
is expressed by the sentence:
(T) ‘The length of the Standard Metre is one metre’
is true by definition and so necessary.
As Kripke points out, the reasoning here is flawed. In fact, even
if we accept that ‘one metre’ is defined by reference to the length
of the Standard Metre, there are (at least) two ways in which such
a definition might be understood. One might understand ‘one
metre’ to be defined either in such a way that the following holds:
an object o at any time t and possible world w is one metre long
at t at w if and only if o is the same length at t at w as is the
Standard Metre at t at w,
or alternatively in such a way that this holds:
an object o at any time t and possible world w is one metre long
at t at w if and only if o is the same length at t at w as the Stan-
dard Metre is at t0 at @ (where t0 is a particular time and @ is
this, the actual world).
Of course, if ‘one metre’ were defined in the former manner,
then it would be necessary that the Standard metre is ‘one metre’
long.
However, if Kripke is correct, the expression ‘one metre’ is not
so defined. According to Kripke, ‘one metre’ designates with
respect to any arbitrary time and world, not the length of the 
Standard Metre whatever it might happen to be at that time and
world, but rather that length which the Standard Metre happens
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the length of the Standard Metre is one metre. They may insist that the expression ‘nec-
essary truth’ is laden with metaphysical baggage that Wittgenstein would certainly reject.
Whether or not my use of the expression ‘necessary truth’ is appropriate in this case, it
does at least seem safe to say that, on Wittgenstein’s view, what is expressed by ‘The Stan-
dard Metre is one metre long’ is not a contingent truth. The dispute between Wittgenstein
and Kripke could easily be re-articulated in these terms.
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to possess at a particular time at this, the actual world. Hence it
is contingent that the Standard Metre is one metre long: it might
not have been the length it actually is.
Kripke expresses this point by saying that ‘one metre’ is a rigid
designator. It designates the same length – i.e. that length actually,
currently possessed by the Standard Metre – with respect to every
possible world. If ‘one metre’ were defined in the former manner,
however, then it would not rigidly designate that length.4
Why favour Kripke’s view of how ‘one metre’ functions over
Wittgenstein’s? What settles the matter, it seems, is a certain
thought experiment. We are invited to test our modal intuitions on
an imaginary case, the case in which the Standard Metre (Kripke’s
‘stick S’) is heated just prior to t0, thus making it a little longer.
Under these circumstances, is the Standard Metre one metre long
at t0? My intuitions say no. The Standard Metre would be more
than one metre long at t0. But then it is not a necessary truth that
S is one metre long at t0.5
My aim in this paper is threefold. First, I explain why the 
reasoning Kripke thinks leads Wittgenstein to suppose that the
Standard Metre is necessarily one metre long is unlikely to be
Wittgenstein’s. Second, I provide a more plausible account of why
Wittgenstein might suppose that the Standard Metre is necessar-
ily one metre long. Third, and most importantly, I explain why I
believe there is after all something to Wittgenstein’s view – the
metric system is relative in something like the way Wittgenstein
seems to think; only it is not relative to the Standard Metre or any
of our metric measures, but to what I call a broader frame of 
reference.
4 ‘One metre’ is now defined, at least in scientific circles, not by reference to the length
of the Standard Metre, but in terms of the wavelength in vacuo of the orange radiation
of the krypton-86 atom. The Wittgensteinian may insist that it must, then, be a necessary
truth that of the wavelength in vacuo of the orange radiation of the krypton-86 atom is
one metre. But of course the same Kripkean intuitions of contingency arise in this case
too. Presumably, the wavelength in vacuo of the orange radiation of the krypton-86 atom
might not have been one metre (i.e. there are possible worlds – worlds at which the laws
of nature are different – at which that wavelength is not one metre).
5 Note, incidentally, that the contingency to which Kripke appeals here can not ade-
quately be explained simply by pointing out that we might not have used the Standard
Metre to define ‘one metre’, or by pointing out that we would no doubt cease to use the
Standard Metre to define ‘one metre’ if it were suddenly to alter in length (I have heard
both suggestions made by defenders of Wittgenstein’s comment on the Standard Metre).
Both suggestions are countered by noting that, even when it is clearly acknowledged that
‘one metre’ is being used in accordance with its actual, current definition, intuition still
suggests that the Standard Metre is only contingently one metre long.
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I begin by distinguishing two different ways in which objects
are used as samples.
Two uses of samples
Consider the following two ways of using an object as a sample:
The use of an object as a definitional sample. What I shall mean by
a definitional sample is a sample used for the purposes of defin-
ing the meaning of a linguistic expression. The use of stick S
to define ‘one metre’ in the manner Kripke describes would
be one example. Similarly, one might define the word ‘pencil’
by means of a pencil, or the word ‘red’ using a swatch of 
material.
The use of an object as a standard sample. Suppose that, while
doing some home repairs, I discover that I have lost my tape
measure. So I improvise a rule out of a piece of wood dowel. I
lay the stick alongside various objects, noting how many multi-
ples of its length or fractions thereof are the lengths of those
other objects. I call this using an object as a standard sample.
Other examples include: using a tuning fork to bring musical
instruments into tune with each other; using a colour chart to
match tins of coloured paint in a store to the paint on one’s
walls at home.
Notice that an object functioning as a standard sample needn’t
function as a definitional sample. I might measure using a piece
of wood dowel without ever introducing a name for its length.
Conversely, an object used to define needn’t function as a stan-
dard. In fact, you might define ‘red’ using as your sample some-
thing it would be impossible to use as a standard, e.g. an object
that undergoes constant, unpredictable colour changes. You
might still point to it at the appropriate moment and say ‘That’s
red’.
The Standard Metre is of course used in both these ways.
Now the line of reasoning Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein is
as follows. The Standard Metre is used to define ‘one metre’. So it
is true by definition and thus necessary that the Standard Metre
is one metre long. Yet it is with the ‘peculiar role’ of the Standard
Metre in ‘the language-game of measuring with a metre rule’6 that
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Wittgenstein is most concerned at Philosophical Investigations §50.
Kripke presents Wittgenstein as focusing on the use of the Stan-
dard Metre as a definitional sample, whereas Wittgenstein is actu-
ally most concerned with its use as standard sample, as a measure.
It seems unlikely, then, that the reasoning Kripke attributes to
Wittgenstein is Wittgenstein’s.
The W-system of measurement
So how might the Standard Metre’s use as measure be relevant to
the claim that the Standard Metre is necessarily one metre long?
I think the most plausible answer to this question is that Wittgen-
stein is operating with a particular conception of what it is for an object
to function as a measure.
Consider the following definition. Let the reference of ‘one W ’
with respect to any arbitrary time t and possible world w be the
length that stick W has at t at w (and be empty otherwise). Thus
stick W can never be and could never have been anything other
than one W long. It is a necessary truth that, if it exists, W is one
W long.
Having thus defined ‘one W ’, we can now set about expressing
the length of a given object as a multiple/fraction of one W. Let’s
say that an object at a given possible world w and time t is 0.5W
long if and only if it is exactly half the length of W at w at t, that
it is 2W long if and only if it is twice as long as W at w at t, and so
on.
Notice that in this system of measurement stick W’s length in
Ws at any arbitrary time and/or world is stipulatively held con-
stant. Stick W is necessarily one W long. Shrink or stretch it: stick
W remains one W long. Indeed, by shortening stick W one alters
the W dimensions of other objects.
I shall call this the W system of measurement.7 As we saw above, it’s
the ‘peculiar role’ of the Standard Metre as a measure that leads
Wittgenstein to suppose that the Standard Metre is necessarily
one metre long. It seems plausible, then, that on Wittgenstein’s
view the ‘peculiar role’ assigned to the Standard Metre in the metric system
is precisely that which is assigned to stick W in the W system. That would
neatly explain the necessity claim.
7 I acknowledge, of course, that this is a ‘system of measurement’ only in a restricted
sense. Objects now have W measurements. But of course there is no actual practice here
of using stick W to measure things.
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Many measures
There is, however, an obvious difference between the metric
system and the W-system: in the metric system more than one
measure is used. We all have our own metric measures.
But the metric system could still be relative in something 
like the way the W system is relative. The metric system might 
be what one might call a majoritarian system. Consider a practice
in which many different sticks are used to measure the length 
one M. It’s stipulated that to be one M long is to be the 
same length as the majority of these sticks. More precisely: for an
object o to be one M long at any world w and time t is just for 
o to possess whatever length is possessed by the majority of 
the relevant sticks at w at t. Hence if one stick had its length
reduced by ten percent but the rest remain unchanged, then that
particular stick would now be only 0.9M long. So it’s contingent
that any particular stick is one M long. Call this the M-system of 
measurement.
The M-system is obviously similar to the W system. Something
is assigned a role analogous to that assigned to stick W in the W
system. The difference is that in the M-system it is not one par-
ticular measure but the majority of measures that is assigned that
role. I shall call all systems of measurement involving one or more
measures where what is assigned the role of stick W is either a
single measure or else a subset or percentage of those measures
W-type systems of measurement.
Is the metric system like the M-system? Obviously, that cannot
be Wittgenstein’s view. If to be one metre long is to be the same
length as the majority of our metre rules, then, pace Wittgenstein,
it would be a contingent fact that the Standard Metre is one metre
long. Wittgenstein, I suggest, believes both that all systems of
measurement are essentially W-type, and also that in the metric
system it’s the Standard Metre alone that plays the role of stick W.
That’s its ‘peculiar role’.
However, our modal intuitions suggest that the metric system
is not any sort of W-type system – not even a majoritarian system.
If the metric system were a W-type system, then it should be impos-
sible for all our metric measures simultaneously to have their
metric dimensions reduced by 10%. But, intuitively, this could
happen. If, for example, there was a complex plot by Martians to
shave down all our metre rules during the night, then all our
metre rules might end up 0.9 metres long.
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The K-system of measurement
How, then does the metric system function? In fact it seems to be
what I call a K-type system of measurement. Suppose we introduce the
expression ‘one K’ to refer to that length which stick K happens
actually to possess at t0. We might then go on to measure length
in Ks using stick K, and do so quite accurately, just so long as stick
K remains the same length. But then, even though the length of
K is used to measure length in Ks – indeed, even though it be the
only thing we use to measure length in Ks – it is nevertheless con-
tingent that stick K is one K long. For stick K might not have been
the length it actually is. Let’s call any system of measurement in
which all measures are used in this way K-type.
An implication of Kripke’s views about how the expression 
‘one metre’ functions is that the Standard Metre has the same
sort of role in the metric system in the same sort of way as 
stick K has in the K system. On Kripke’s view, ‘one metre’ 
names a certain length: that length which the Standard Metre
happens currently to possess. Thus the Standard Metre is only 
correctly used to measure length in metres on the condition 
that it remains that same length. Intuitively, it seems Kripke is
right about this.
In fact, it seems that, while we certainly might introduce a W-
type system of measurement, all our actual systems of measure-
ment are K-type and not W-type. For example, consider a situation
in which all our kilogram weights have their weight reduced by
10% overnight, everything else remaining the same. When I test
my modal intuitions with the question, “What would be the weight
in kilograms of those kilogram weights?” they say they would
weigh only 0.9 kilograms. It would surely be wrong to describe the
weight in kilograms of everything else as having increased. So the
metric system of measuring weight would also appear to be a 
K-type system.
The background to K-type systems of measurement
Wittgenstein apparently believes that all systems of measurement
are W-type. But our modal intuitions suggest our actual systems
are K-type.
But perhaps Wittgenstein is not wholly wrong. As I will argue
shortly, it does seem that something functions in the metric system
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in a manner analogous to the way stick W functions in the W
system, even if it isn’t any of our measures.
Let’s now turn to The Smedlium Case.
The Smedlium Case
Imagine a world quite similar to our own that contains large quan-
tities of a metal-like material – let’s call it smedlium – which grad-
ually and unpredictably alters in size. All smedlium objects
expand and contract in unison. At one o’clock on one particular
day all the smedlium objects are 5% larger than they were at mid-
day; at two o’clock they are all 10% smaller, and so on. Despite
this peculiarity, smedlium remains a useful material. In fact, it is
the strongest and most durable material available. One of the
inhabitants of this world builds machinery made wholly out of
smedlium. The machines are used in situations where their size
relative to non-smedlium objects doesn’t matter. The smedlium
engineer constructs and calibrates a measuring rule made out of
smedlium to use when manufacturing such machines. She meas-
ures dimensions in ‘S’s, one S being measured against the length
of her smedlium measure. Of course, so far as manufacturing
smedlium machines is concerned, a smedlium measure is far
more useful than is a rule made out of some more stable mate-
rial, for it allows the smedlium engineer to ignore the changes in
size of the object upon which she is working. For example, she
knows that, say, if the hole for the grunge lever measured 0.5S in
diameter at one o’clock, then a grunge lever which measures 
0.5S in diameter at two o’clock will just fit into that hole, despite
the fact that the hole is now noticeably smaller than it was at 
one o’clock.
Now one might think that here at least is one case in which a meas-
uring rod functions as does stick W in the W system, not as does stick K
in the K system. Surely, one might argue, what ‘one S’ designates
with respect to any arbitrary time and world is the length of the
smedlium engineer’s measuring rod whatever it might be at that
time and world, not the length that it actually possesses at some
particular moment in time. The smedlium system must be a W-
type system.
And yet, oddly enough, we have the same modal intuitions about
the smedlium system as we do about the metric system. It seems that the
smedlium measuring rod might cease to possess the measurement
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one S. It might actually come to possess e.g. the measurement 
0.9S.
Suppose, for example, that mid-way through a month when 
the smedlium engineer is working on a particularly important
project, a saboteur breaks into the smedlium engineer’s workshop
and indulges in some industrial espionage. The saboteur shaves
10% off the end off the smedlium measuring rod knowing this
will cause the smedlium engineer all sorts of problems. Isn’t it 
the case that the smedlium measuring rod no longer possess the
measurement one S ? To me, this certainly seems the right way to
describe the situation. Indeed, it seems right to say that the
smedlium measuring rod now has the measurement 0.9S, given
that it is now 10% shorter than it would otherwise have been.
It also seems right to say that the smedlium measure might
never have had the measurement one S: it might always have been
only 0.9S long (one might tell a story on which the mould in
which stick S was originally cast leaks at one end, producing a
sightly shorter stick). So, intuitively, it is contingent that the
smedlium measuring rod possesses the measurement one S.
A puzzle for Kripke
So we have the same sort of modal intuitions about the smedlium
system as we do about the metric system. However, while it appears
to be contingent that the smedlium measuring rod possesses the
measurement one S, note that there is prima facie, a problem in
applying the Kripkean explanation of the contingency. We saw that the
Kripkean explanation of why it is contingent that the Standard
Metre possesses the dimension one metre is that ‘one metre’ is a
rigid designator: it rigidly designates a certain length – a length the
Standard Metre happens only contingently to possess. But note
that this explanation is unavailable when it comes to explaining why it
is contingent that the smedlium measuring rod possesses the dimension
one S. Clearly, “one S” doesn’t rigidly designate a length. An object
can retain the dimension one S even while altering in length.
This raises a difficulty for Kripke: it seems that, in the smedlium
case, the intuition of contingency is going to have to be accounted for in
some other way. But if in the smedlium case the contingency is to
be explained other than by supposing that ‘one S’ is a rigid desig-
nator (of a certain length), then presumably that same alternative
explanation might be provided in the metric case too.
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In fact, one might begin to wonder whether the metric and
smedlium systems aren’t both W-type systems after all. Just how
reliable are these Kripkean intuitions of contingency upon which
so much importance has been placed? Kripke’s argument against
the metric system being a W-type system no longer looks quite so
decisive.
Relativizing to a frame of reference
What, then, does explain the intuition of contingency concern-
ing the S measurements of the smedlium measuring rod? What
does ‘one S’ name, if not a length? Why, if all previous changes
in S’s length didn’t affect its S measurements, does the change in
its length affected by the saboteur affect its S measurements?
In fact the Kripkean explanation can still be applied here if we
are prepared to introduce a relativized notion of ‘length’. As I
explain below, one might suggest that ‘one S’ does rigidly desig-
nate a ‘length’ of sorts, it’s just that it designates a length relative
to a frame of reference other than one with which we are ordi-
narily familiar.
Arguably, at least some of our judgements concerning same-
ness of length are made relative to the frame of reference con-
stituted by the medium sized dry goods (trees, hills, houses, rocks
and pebbles, etc.) with which are ordinarily surrounded. They
constitute the frame of reference relative to which one might cor-
rectly describe one’s trousers as having shrunk or one’s gerani-
ums as having grown taller. Whether or not we already possess
such a relativized notion of length, let’s now introduce one. Let’s
say that, on this relativized notion of ‘length’, two objects at dif-
ferent times and/or worlds differ in ‘length’ just to the extent that
their dimensions expressed as a fraction of the mean of all the
dimensions of those medium-sized dry goods at those times and
worlds differ. Thus, on this relativized notion of ‘length’, if, in
some actual or counterfactual situation, not only my trousers
shrink but so too do all the relevant medium-sized dry goods by
the exact same amount, then my trousers continue to remain the
same ‘length’.
Clearly, ‘one S’ doesn’t name a ‘length’ relative to this frame
of reference. However, it may yet name a ‘length’ relative to some
other frame of reference. Suppose, for example, that the frame
of reference to which the ‘length’ in question is relative is con-
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stituted by the mean of the dimensions of all the other smedlium
objects, including those upon which the smedlium engineer has
been working. We might then explain why the change in the
length of the smedlium measuring rod affected by the saboteur
is a change which, unlike all previous changes in its length, results
in it ceasing to possess the measurement one S. It’s a change
which alters its length not just relative to our familiar frame of
reference, but also relative to this alternative frame of reference.
A Kripkean resolution of the Smedlium Case
Let’s introduce the expressions ‘lengthS’ and ‘lengthM’ to indicate
when we are using the two relativized notions of length outlined
above. Differences in lengthM are relative to the frame of refer-
ence constituted by the sort of medium-sized dry goods actually
found in our local environment; differences in lengthS are rela-
tive to the frame of reference constituted by the smedlium
objects.
Having allowed talk about ‘length’ to be relativized to differ-
ent frames of reference, we can now provide a Kripkean expla-
nation of the contingency of the smedlium measuring rod being
one S long can now be applied. ‘One S’ is indeed a rigid desig-
nator. It rigidly designates a certain lengthS. This lengthS is only
contingently possessed by stick S. Stick S ceases to possess the
lengthS one S when the saboteur shaves down one end.
But notice that we can only apply the Kripkean explanation if
we are prepared to allow for such relativized notions of ‘length’.
So, unless Kripke is prepared to allow for such relativized notions of
‘length’, the smedlium case remains a problem for him.
A parallel between the smedlium and W-systems
Notice that in the smedlium engineer’s system of measurement
the designation of ‘one S’ with respect to any arbitrary time t and
world w is tied to the dimensions of the relevant smedlium objects
at t at w. So, although the smedlium engineer’s system of meas-
urement is a K-type system, nevertheless something functions in her
system in a manner akin to the way stick W functions in the W
system. Just as, in the W system, the W dimensions of stick W are
held constant for all times and worlds, so (we’re supposing) in
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the S system the mean of the dimensions of the relevant smedlium
objects (or something similar8) is held constant for all times and
worlds.
Is the metric system like the smedlium engineer’s system?
We are now in a position to appreciate that while the intuitions
to which Kripke appeals – namely that ‘one metre’ is a rigid des-
ignator and that the Standard Metre is only contingently one
metre long – may indeed indicate that the metric system is a K-
type system, not a W-type system, nevertheless these intuitions 
do not indicate that the metric system isn’t relative in the same
sort of way as the smedlium engineer’s system. For we have 
analogous intuitions when it comes to the smedlium engineer’s system of
measurement.
Indeed, notice that our intuitions about the metric case do not
indicate that Wittgenstein isn’t right to suppose that something
functions in the metric system as does stick W in the W system,
though of course they do indicate that Wittgenstein is wrong to
suppose that what plays that role is the Standard Metre. That is,
it may yet turn out that something plays a role in the metric system
analogous to that played by the smedlium objects in the smedlium
system.
I will shortly turn to the question of whether the metric system
actually is relative in this way. But before I do so, let’s briefly 
consider some other similarly relativistic systems of measurement
and then contrast them with what I call absolute systems of 
measurement.
Other frames of reference
Notice that, when introducing a system of measurement by defin-
ing ‘one K’ by reference to a bar known to be made out of some
more familiar and stable material, there are still many different
background frames of reference we might adopt. To illustrate,
consider the following scenario.
Suppose that a community of astrophysicists (who work only at
night) decide to adopt a certain stick – stick K – as a measure.
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They carefully store stick K in a large box from which they occa-
sionally remove it to check and calibrate their instruments. Coin-
cidentally, the morning after the astrophysicists adopt stick K as
their measure the park keepers enter the laboratory looking for
something to mark out the grounds surrounding the laboratory.
They chance upon the stick K lying in its box and decide to use
it as a rule to measure out and keep a record of the dimensions
of the layout of their grounds. Each evening they carefully return
stick K to its box. And so two practices of using the length of stick
K as a measure happen to develop quite independently of each
other.
Let’s also suppose that, again coincidentally, both the astro-
physicists and the park keepers use the expression ‘one K’ 
to name that unit of measurement of which they use K as 
their only measure. Indeed, let’s suppose that both communities
introduce the expression ‘one K’ to function as a rigid designa-
tor of, as they put it, a certain “length”: the “length” of stick K at
time t0.
Now suppose that, for some strange reason, the planet on
which the astrophysicists and park keepers live and everything on
it gradually shrinks over a period of one month. Suppose that, 
relative to a much larger frame of reference, the dimensions of
stick K at time t1 are exactly 10% less than they were at time t0.
Consider the question: does stick K retain the measurement
one K at t1? The answer to this question depends at least in part
upon on what, if anything, constitutes the relevant background
frame of reference in each system of measurement. It seems to
me that, given the interests and concerns of the park keepers,
their system of measurement is likely to be relative to some com-
paratively local frame of reference. Let’s say that the frame of ref-
erence in question is constituted by the immediate countryside.
In which case the park keepers may truly declare that K still
retains the dimension ‘one K’ at t1. If informed about the shrink-
age of their planet, the park keepers will dismiss it as an irrele-
vance: they will insist the K-measurements of both stick K and
their flowerbeds remain unaffected. Given the astrophysicists’
interests and concerns, on the other hand (i.e. given that they use
their system to frame scientific hypotheses about how the universe
as a whole behaves), they may relativize their system of measure-
ment to some much larger frame of reference. Let’s suppose that
this is the case. Then the astrophysicists may truly declare that
stick K is only ‘0.9K’ long at t1.
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In short, while both communities define the expression ‘one
K’ in such a way that it functions as a rigid designator of that unit
of measurement of which they use stick K as their sole sample, if
their respective systems of measurement are relative to different
frames of reference, then they nevertheless use ‘one K’ to refer
to different units of measurement. The astrophysicists introduce
‘one K’ as a rigid designator of a lengthA; the park keepers intro-
duce ‘one K’ as a rigid designator of a lengthP.
Absolute length
We have looked at a number of different K-type systems of meas-
urement of length. Each is relativized to a different frame of ref-
erence. But must all K-type systems of measurement similarly be
relativized?
Maybe not. Perhaps we can correctly describe objects at differ-
ent times and/or worlds as being absolutely the same length – as 
I shall put it, the same Length (with a capital ‘L’) – as opposed 
to merely being the same lengthS, the same lengthM, the same
lengthP, the same lengthA, etc. While an attribution of lengthS,
lengthM, lengthP or lengthA etc. to an object in some actual or
counterfactual circumstance is always made relative to a frame of
reference, an attribution of Length is made independently of any
frame of reference.
Krelative and Kabsolute systems of measurement
We are now in a position to distinguish two varieties of K-type
system: those that are relativized to some frame of reference or
other and those that are not. Let’s distinguish them by calling the
former Krelative systems and the latter Kabsolute systems.
Krelative and W-type systems of measurement are similar in that
both involve something being assigned a role analogous to that
assigned to stick W in the W system. Krelative systems differ from
W-type systems in that, although something is assigned a role anal-
ogous to that assigned to stick W, it isn’t what we use to do our meas-
uring. Rather, it is what I have been calling the background frame
of reference that is assigned that role.
Clearly, the smedlium engineer’s system is not a Kabsolute
system. It is a Krelative system. I have suggested that in the
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smedlium system it is the various other smedlium objects that con-
stitute the relevant background frame of reference.
Central conclusion
My primary concern in this paper has been to develop a clearer
picture of how the metric system of measurement, and indeed all
our systems of measurement, may operate. I have, in effect, pro-
vided two very different accounts. The metric system may be a
Kabsolute system. Or it may be a Krelative system.
Intuitively, Kripke is right: the metric dimensions of the Stan-
dard Metre, and indeed the rest of our metric measures, might
all have been, say, ten percent less than they actually are. Our intu-
itions support the contention that the metric system is a K-type
system, not a W-type system. My central conclusion is that this intu-
ition is equally consistent with both the hypothesis that the metric system
is a Kabsolute system and the hypothesis that the metric system is, like the
smedlium engineer’s system, a Krelative system.
Krelative systems are certainly a possibility, as the smedlium
case illustrates. Indeed, as I have explained, we need to acknowl-
edge their possibility in order to apply the Kripkean explanation
to our intuitions concerning the smedlium case.
If the metric system is indeed a Krelative system, then Wittgen-
stein is partially vindicated. Something functions in the metric
system as stick W functions in the W system. It’s just that what has
this function isn’t the Standard Metre, or indeed any of our
metric measures.
Final question: Is the metric system a K-relative system?
This brings us to our final question. Granted that the modal intu-
itions to which Kripke appeals are neutral between the metric
system being a Krelative system and a Kabsolute system, which is
it?
I believe the metric system is a Krelative system. I shall not
attempt to make a knock-down case for the conclusion here. 
But I shall indicate why that seems to me to be the more likely
alternative.
Let’s begin by anticipating some objections to the suggestion
that the metric system is a Krelative system.
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You might argue that the metric system must be a Kabsolute
system for the following reason. A definition of the expression
‘one metre’ by reference to the length of the Standard Metre will
typically take place in the absence of any deliberation concerning
what, if anything, is to constitute the relevant frame of reference.
Indeed, don’t we thereby succeed in ‘fixing the reference’ of ‘one
metre’ with respect to any arbitrary time and world without our
having to adopt any frame of reference at all? If so, then ‘one
metre’, thus defined, must designate an absolute Length rather
than a length relativized to some frame of reference or other. 
But then the metric system must be a Kabsolute system, not a 
Krelative system.
This objection is easily dealt with. Compare the smedlium engi-
neer’s system of measurement. She introduces ‘one S’ to name
that unit of measurement of which she uses stick S as her only
measure. Now her definition of ‘one S’ is certainly also unlikely
to involve any explicit appeal to a frame of reference. Indeed, that
her system of measurement is relativized to frame of reference,
let alone that it is relativized to a frame of reference constituted
by the other smedlium objects, may well be a fact of which she is
not fully cognizant. Yet it is clear that her system of measurement
nevertheless is relative to a frame of reference. Obviously, ‘one S’
does not name a Length. It names a lengthS (or something
similar). So the engineer’s ‘reference-fixing’ definition of ‘one S’
by reference to stick S must involve at least an implicit appeal to
some frame of reference or other. Presumably, what functions as
the relevant frame of reference in the smedlium case is deter-
mined, not by any conscious decision on her part, but by (broadly
speaking) the use to which she puts her system of measurement.9
But then the fact that we may similarly define ‘one metre’
without giving any thought to what, if anything, is to constitute
the relevant frame of reference is similarly consistent with the
metric system also being a Krelative system.
I acknowledge that a difficult question remains, however: if our
talk about ‘length’ is relative, then to what is it relative? – I touch
on this question below.
Clearly the suggestion that the metric system – and, indeed, our
talk about ‘length’ generally – is relative to say, the frame of 
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reference constituted by planet Earth is undermined by the intu-
ition the metric dimensions of the Earth might not have been
what they actually are, e.g. they might have been ten percent less.
Similar intuitions appear to undermine most of the other more
obvious suggestions that might be made concerning what consti-
tutes the relevant frame of reference.
Consider, for example, the suggestion that the frame of refer-
ence relative to which our talk of length is relative is constituted
by all physical dimensions – those of everything in the entire uni-
verse. Even this suggestion would appear to be undermined by yet
another Kripkean modal intuition: might not all these dimensions
have been a little less, or become a little less, than they actually,
currently are? It seems they might. Indeed, that such a shrinkage
had taken place might even be verifiable. If the laws of nature
remain unaltered, all sorts of differences will manifest themselves:
many processes will take less time to occur; our bodies will sud-
denly seem stronger, and so on. It may well be that the smoothest
and most plausible way to account for all these changes might
indeed just be to suppose that everything has shrunk a bit. But if
it makes sense to suppose that everything might shrink a bit, does
that not entail that by ‘length’ we must mean Length?
Again, not necessarily. The frame of reference need not – or
need not just – include the physical dimensions of things (by which
I mean, roughly, the dimensions of physical objects and the dis-
tances between them). It may incorporate, at least indirectly, the
laws of nature themselves (for example, if the frame of reference
to which a K-relative system of measurement is relative is, say, the
distance traveled by light in a fixed period of time, then a change
in the laws governing light’s speed will affect that frame of refer-
ence, and thus also the K-measurements of things.) So perhaps
the frame of reference is constituted by the universe as a whole,
including its laws. And in fact it is not so clear that we can make
sense of the possibility of a universe just like this one except that,
while all physical dimensions are reduced slightly, there is also,
nevertheless, a corresponding adjustment to the laws of nature
effectively cancelling out any possible manifestation of that reduc-
tion. Yet if by ‘length’ we mean Length, we should be able to make
sense of that possibility. So our modal intuitions seem finally to favour
the view that the metric system is a Krelative system.
There is a further reason why our difficulty in specifying pre-
cisely to what the metric system is relative should not be consid-
ered decisive against the suggestion that the metric system is
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Krelative. For note that we run into similar difficulties when it comes
to specifying what constitutes the relevant frame of reference in the
smedlium case, a case in which we clearly aren’t dealing with a Kabsolute
system.
Consider, for example, my tentative suggestion that the
smedlium system is relative to the mean of the dimensions of the
relevant smedlium objects. On closer inspection, this suggestion
seems not to be quite right. For can’t we not envisage counter-
factual circumstances in which the mean of the dimensions of the
relevant smedlium objects, expressed as a fraction/multiple of
one S, is other than what it actually is? Suppose, for example, that
our smedlium engineer invents a machine that shrinks objects (be
they made out of smedlium or some other material). Place an
object or number of objects (made out of some ordinary mate-
rial – not smedlium) inside the machine and press the start button
and the dimensions of those objects are reduced by 10%. Now
suppose that a very large version of this machine is built and all
the smedlium objects that exist are placed inside and the button
pressed. What are the S dimensions of all those smedlium objects
now? My intuitions favour the suggestion that the S dimensions
of all those objects have just been reduced by 10%. But then my
original suggestion concerning what constitutes the relevant
frame of reference in the smedlium case cannot be exactly right.
It seems that, though the smedlium system is a Krelative system,
not a Kabsolute system, we run into exactly the same sort of dif-
ficulties in specifying to what the system is relative as we do in the
metric case. But then the latter difficulties do not count heavily
against the suggestion that the metric system is itself a Krelative
system.
There’s a another reason for favouring the view that the metric
system is Krelative. Even if we allow that there are such things 
as absolute Lengths (and perhaps we should not), surely any
absolute Length would be too disengaged from actual our prac-
tice of measuring, recording, talking about, etc. metric dimen-
sions for it plausibly to be considered a candidate for the
reference of ‘one metre’.
Final conclusion
It seems to me that the metric system is much more likely to be
a Krelative system than a Kabsolute system. In order to apply the
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Kripkean explanation of why it is contingent that the smedlium
engineer’s measuring rod is one S long we need to introduce rel-
ativized notions of length. ‘One S’, it seems, is a rigid designator:
it rigidly designates a lengthS. This raises the possibility that what
‘one metre’ rigidly designates is also a length relative to some
background frame of reference or other. We have yet to see a
cogent objection to the view that the metric system isn’t relative
in this way.
Indeed, it seems probable that the metric system is a Krelative
system. In which case Wittgenstein is partially vindicated: the
metric system is relative in something like the way Wittgenstein
suggests. Only it is not relative to the Standard Metre, or indeed
to any of our metric measures. Rather, it is relative to what I call
a background frame of reference.
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